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Abstract
Facing a heavy task, any single person can only make a limited contribution
and team cooperation is needed. As one enjoys the benefit of the public
goods, the potential benefits of the project are not always maximized and
may be partly wasted. By incorporating individual ability and project ben-
efit into the original public goods game, we study the coupling effect of the
four parameters, the upper limit of individual contribution, the upper limit
of individual benefit, the needed project cost and the upper limit of project
benefit on the evolution of cooperation. Coevolving with the individual-level
group size preferences, an increase in the upper limit of individual benefit
promotes cooperation while an increase in the upper limit of individual con-
tribution inhibits cooperation. The coupling of the upper limit of individual
contribution and the needed project cost determines the critical point of the
upper limit of project benefit, where the equilibrium frequency of cooperators
reaches its highest level. Above the critical point, an increase in the upper
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limit of project benefit inhibits cooperation. The evolution of cooperation is
closely related to the preferred group-size distribution. A functional relation
between the frequency of cooperators and the dominant group size is found.
Keywords: public goods game, individual ability, project benefit,
group-size preference
1. Introduction
The occurrence and maintenance of cooperation in a competitive setting
have drawn much attention of biologists, economists, sociologists, mathemati-
cians and statistical physicists[1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7], which is similar to the diffu-
sion systems and the complex systems in the physical world[8, 9, 10, 11, 12,
13, 14]. In order to find the internal mechanism of the Nash equilibrium and
the flourish of cooperation among completely rational individuals, evolution-
ary game theory and quite a few classical game models, such as the prisoner’s
dilemma (PD) and the snowdrift game (SG), have been employed to model
the evolution of altruistic behaviour[15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23]. The
PD is a standard metaphor to explain the evolution of cooperation through
pairwise interactions. For group interactions, the public goods game (PGG)
represents a straightforward generalization of the PD. The SG is also a co-
operative game model describing pairwise interactions. The only difference
between the PD and the SG is the payoff matrix. In the PD, a coopera-
tor gets nothing. In the SG, a cooperator has a net gain after deducting
the cost of cooperation. The N-person snowdrift game (NSG) represents a
straightforward generalization of the SG.
In the original PGG[24, 25], each individual has to decide whether to
make a contribution to a common pool or not. As all the individuals have
made their decisions, the total investment in the common pool is multiplied
and distributed equally among all the members in the interacting group.
Those who contribute to the common pool are cooperators and those who
make no contribution are defectors. A rational analysis will result in such
a bad scenario where nearly all the individuals contribute nothing to the
common pool in order to obtain a higher personal gain and the tragedy of
the commons occurs. In the PGG, each cooperator’s contribution is the same
and predefined. An increase in the number of cooperators in the interacting
group does not change each cooperator’s contribution but leads to a rise of
the total cost and the total benefit. Different from the payoff functions in
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the PGG, in the NSG[26, 27], having finished a task, each member of the
interacting group gets the same and predefined benefit while the predefined
cost is evenly shared by cooperators. Therefore, in the NSG, the total benefit
increases while the total cost does not change with the rise of the group
members.
However, in real society, the evolutionary mechanism in the PGG and
that in the NSG may coexit[28]. The upper limit of individual ability and
the upper limit of project benefit may result in such a scenario: facing a
heavy task, an individual can do nothing because of his limited ability. Only
when there are quite a few cooperators in the interacting group can the task
be finished and the project benefit be obtained. For example, the task of
moving a big and heavy rock or hunting a big creature can not be finished
until there are enough cooperators in the interacting group. The impact of
the critical mass or the start-up cost on the evolution of cooperation has
been discussed by A. Szolnoki et al[29, 30]. In addition to that, the profit
from finishing the heavy task depends on the potential benefits of the project
and the characteristics of the individuals who have the right to enjoy such
benefits. The existence of the upper limit of individual benefit may result in
such a scenario where the project benefits are partly wasted. For example,
as a bridge has been built, its bearing capacity may not be fully exploited
until there are quite a few individuals to-and-fro. As a group of wolves have
captured a big deer, they usually enjoy a good meal and give up the leftovers.
The profit from hunting a big creature can not be maximized until there are
quite a few wolves in the group. As the project benefit has been maximized,
an increase in the team members will lead to a decrease in the individual
benefit. Although the start-up cost and the coupling of the PD game and
the SG game have been discussed in refs.[29, 30, 31, 32], the coupling effect
of individual ability and project benefit on the evolution of cooperation and
the coupling model of PGG and NSG are left unconsidered.
The coupling effect of different kinds of games on the evolution of coop-
eration is usually studied depending upon the threshold game models[30, 33,
34, 35, 36]. A. Szolnoki1 et al. have incorporated the start-up costs into the
public goods game[30]. They have found that the existence of a threshold
acting as an initial contribution to the common pool can promote the lev-
els of cooperation effectively. M. Perc has incorporated the success-driven
mechanism into the public goods game[33]. He has found that the repro-
ductive success of individuals promotes cooperation effectively irrespective
of the interaction structure. A. Szolnoki1 et al. have introduced a level of
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payoff acting as a threshold for an individual to organize the public goods
game[34]. They have found that such a mechanism can keep cooperation at
a somewhat high level. X. J. Chen et al. have incorporated maximal endow-
ments into the public goods game[35]. They have found that an excessive
abundance of common resources is detrimental to cooperation. J.L. Zhang
et al. have incorporated an insurance covering the potential loss into the
threshold public goods game[36]. They have found that an increase in the
compensation from the insurance leads to more contributions. The role of
other threshold parameters in the evolution of cooperation has been discussed
in refs.[37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45, 46, 47, 48].
The evolution of individual strategies may not be sufficient for the oc-
currence and maintenance of cooperation among selfish individuals. The co-
evolutionary mechanism, such as the coevolution of the individual strategies
and the interaction structures, may be seen as an effective way to promote
cooperation. M. Perc et al. have reviewed the coevolutionary rules affecting
the evolution of cooperation[49]. The rules of mutual interaction, population
growth, reproduction, mobility, reputation and aging have a powerful effect
on the evolution of cooperation.
To mimic the limitedness of individual ability and the potential benefits
of the project, in the present we introduce four parameters, the upper limit
of individual contribution, the upper limit of individual benefit, the needed
project cost and the upper limit of project benefit into the original PGG. In
addition to that, the evolution of the individual-level group-size preferences
is also considered. Accompanied by the coevolution of the preferred group-
sizes and the strategies of cooperation and defection, the coupling effect
of individual ability and project benefit on the evolution of cooperation is
extensively studied. We have three main findings.
(1) A higher level of individual contribution leads to a lower level of
cooperation while a higher level of the upper limit of individual benefit leads
to a higher level of cooperation. In the process of carrying out a heavy
task with a given cost, if an individual’s maximum contribution is limited,
there should be more cooperators in finishing the task. The existence of the
start-up cost promotes cooperation. As the upper limit of individual benefit
increases, an individual is more possible to obtain a higher benefit, which
leads to a higher level of cooperation.
(2) A higher level of the upper limit of project benefit leads to a lower
level of cooperation. There exists a critical point of the upper limit of project
benefit, below which the equilibrium frequency of cooperators changes little
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with the rise of the upper limit of project benefit and above which an increase
in the upper limit of project benefit leads to a decrease in cooperation. The
critical point is determined by the coupling of the upper limit of individual
contribution and the needed project cost.
(3) A higher level of cooperation is in accordance with a smaller value of
the dominant group size. The frequency of cooperators coevolves with the
individual-level group size preferences. The occurrence of a higher level of
cooperation is accompanied by the occurrence of a smaller dominant group
size. A functional relation between the equilibrium frequency of cooperators
and the dominant group size is found.
The generalized public goods game (GPGG) is presented in section 2.
Simulation results and discussions are given in section 3. In section 4 we give
a theoretical analysis on the relationship between the equilibrium frequency
of cooperators and the dominant group size. In section 5 we summarize our
conclusions.
2. The model
The generalized public goods game (GPGG) is defined as follows. As-
suming there is a project with the needed project cost Cpro and the upper
limit of project benefit Bmaxpro . If there are enough cooperators in the inter-
acting group, nC ≥ n
min
C , the project can be finished and the project benefit
Bpro depends on the upper limit of project benefit B
max
pro , the upper limit of
individual benefit BmaxI and the number of individuals n in the interacting
group. On condition that nBmaxI ≤ B
max
pro , Bpro = nB
max
I . On condition that
nBmaxI > B
max
pro , Bpro = B
max
pro . If there are not enough cooperators in the
interacting group, nC < n
min
C , the project can not be finished and the project
benefit is Bpro = 0.
The threshold of the number of cooperators nminC is determined by the
needed project cost Cpro and the upper limit of individual contribution C
max
I ,
which is satisfied with the equation nminC = [
Cpro
Cmax
I
] + 1 for Cpro
Cmax
I
> [ Cpro
Cmax
I
] and
nminC = [
Cpro
Cmax
I
] for Cpro
Cmax
I
= [ Cpro
Cmax
I
]. For nC ≥ n
min
C , a cooperator’s contribution
to the project is CC =
Cpro
nC
and a defector’s contribution to the project is
CD = 0. For nC < n
min
C , neither cooperators nor defectors make a contribu-
tion to the project, CC = CD = 0.
The value of nminC is closely related to the values of Cpro and C
max
I . The
relationship between nminC and
Cpro
Cmax
I
is a step function. For example, within
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the range of Cpro ≤ C
max
I , n
min
C = 1, within the range of 1 <
Cpro
Cmax
I
≤ 2, nminc =
2. Such an assumption is in accordance with the scenario where we have to
finish a heavy and indivisible task. For example, if the road was blocked
by a heavy rock, it is difficult for an individual to remove the roadblock
alone. There should be more cooperative individuals to lift the heavy rock
together. In order to catch a giant prey, such as an adult buffalo, a tiger needs
more cooperative partners. Or else, such a heavy and indivisible task can
not be finished successfully. Although the present model is too simplified to
account for the real situations completely, it may become suitable for further
researches in the direction of discontinuous task problems.
Each individual has a preference for the group-size n[50, 51, 52, 53]. At
each time step, firstly, we randomly choose an individual i with the preferred
group-size ni from the total N individuals. Then, from the left N−1 individ-
uals we randomly choose another ni−1 individuals. The payoff of individual
i is obtained, Pi = PC for a cooperator and Pi = PD for a defector. Thirdly,
we randomly choose another individual j and obtain his payoff Pj. With
probability
ωi←j =
1
1 + e(Pi−Pj+τ)/κ
, (1)
in which τ = κ = 0.1, individual i adopts individual j’s strategy. Or else,
individual i doesn’t update his strategy. Fourthly, individual i compares
his payoff Pi with the averaged payoff of all the individuals P¯ . If Pi < P¯ ,
individual i randomly chooses another group-size n′i from the range of n
′
i ∈
[ni − 1, ni + 1] and updates his preferred group-size ni with group-size n
′
i.
If Pi ≥ P¯ , individual i doesn’t update his preferred group-size. Both the
strategies and the preferred group-sizes are updated asynchronously.
The payoffs of cooperators and defectors are as follows. For nCC
max
I ≥
Cpro and B
max
pro ≥ nB
max
I ,
PC = B
max
I −
Cpro
nC
, PD = B
max
I . (2)
For nCC
max
I ≥ Cpro and B
max
pro < nB
max
I ,
PC =
Bmaxpro
n
−
Cpro
nC
, PD =
Bmaxpro
n
. (3)
For nCC
max
I < C
max
pro ,
PC = PD = 0. (4)
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The proposed GPGG model is a coupling model of the PGG and the
NSG. Consider the case where all the individuals have the same preferred
group-size n and it does not range with time. Comparing the payoffs in the
present model with that in the NSG, we find that the original NSG model can
be obtained as a special case of the present model. In the NSG, the payoffs of
a cooperator and a defector are satisfied with the equations PC = BI −
Cpro
nC
and PD = BI . In the present model, within the range of nCC
max
I ≥ Cpro
and nBmaxI ≤ B
max
pro , the payoffs of a cooperator and a defector are satisfied
with the equations PC = B
max
I −
Cpro
nC
and PD = B
max
I . On condition that
CmaxI ∼ ∞ and Bpro = nBI , the payoffs in the NSG can be obtained from the
payoffs in the present model. Comparing the payoffs in the traditional PGG
with that in the present model, we also find that the traditional PGG can
be obtained as a special case of the present model. In the traditional PGG,
the payoffs of a cooperator and a defector are satisfied with the equations
PC =
rnCx
n
− x and PD =
rnCx
n
, in which r is the multiplication factor and x
is the contribution of a cooperator. In the present model, within the range
of nCC
max
I ≥ Cpro and nB
max
I ≥ B
max
pro , the payoffs of a cooperator and a
defector are satisfied with the equations PC =
Bmaxpro
n
−
Cpro
nC
and PD =
Bmaxpro
n
.
On condition that BmaxI ∼ ∞, CI = x, Cpro = nCCI and Bpro = rCpro,
the payoffs in the traditional PGG can be obtained from the payoffs in the
present model.
Consider the case where the preferred group-sizes deviate from the δ-
function, due to the coexistence of n and n’, which are satisfied with the
inequalities nBmaxI ≥ B
max
pro and n
′BmaxI < B
max
pro respectively, the proposed
model become the coupling model of the original PGG and the NSG. The
payoff functions in the original PGG accompanied with the payoff functions
in the NSG determine the evolutionary dynamics in the present model. The
coupling model of the PD and the SG is also presented in ref.[54, 55].
3. Simulation results and discussions
Starting with the basic setup where the strategies and the preferred group-
sizes are randomly chosen. To explore the coupling effect of the upper limit of
individual contribution CmaxI and the upper limit of project benefit B
max
pro on
the prevalence of cooperation, in fig. 1 we plot the frequency of cooperators fc
as a function of Bmaxpro for different C
max
I . For a given C
max
I =10, the critical
point of Bmaxcpro ∼ 300 is observed. As B
max
pro increases from B
max
pro ∼ 0 to
Bmaxpro ∼ 300, fc keeps its minimum value of fc ∼ 0. As B
max
pro increases from
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Figure 1: the frequency of cooperators fC as a function of the upper limit of project benefit
Bmaxpro for the upper limit of individual contribution C
max
I =10 (circles), 15 (squares). Other
parameters are: the upper limit of individual benefit BmaxI =60, the needed project cost
Cpro=30, the minimum group size nmin = 2, the maximum group size nmax = 50, the
total number of individuals N=1000. The data are obtained by averaging over 10 runs
and 103 time steps after 104 relaxation time in each run.
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Figure 2: the frequency of cooperators fc (a) as a function of the upper limit of individual
contribution CmaxI for the upper limit of project benefit B
max
pro =700 (circles), 800 (squares),
1000 (triangles), 1500 (stars); (b) as a function of the minimum number of cooperators
nminC for B
max
pro =700 (circles), 800 (squares), 1000 (triangles), 1500 (stars). Other parame-
ters are: the upper limit of individual benefit BmaxI =60, the needed project cost Cpro=30,
the minimum group size nmin = 2, the maximum group size nmax = 50, the total number
of individuals N=1000. The data are obtained by averaging over 10 runs and 103 time
steps after 104 relaxation time in each run.
Bmaxpro ∼ 300 to B
max
pro ∼ 480, fc has a sharp rise from fc ∼ 0 to fc ∼ 0.64.
The prevalence of cooperation, i.e. fc ∼ 0.64, is observed at the point of
Bmaxcpro ∼ 480. As B
max
pro increases from B
max
pro ∼ 480 to B
max
pro ∼ 2000, fc
decreases continuously from fc ∼ 0.64 to fc ∼ 0.1. As B
max
pro increases from
Bmaxpro ∼ 2000 to infinity, fc has little change with the rise of B
max
pro . For a
larger CmaxI , the critical point of B
maxc
pro becomes smaller and the changing
tendency of fc vs B
max
pro changes little.
The frequency of cooperator fc as a function of C
max
I for different B
max
pro
is presented in fig. 2 (a). The dependence of fc on C
max
I is like a step
function. For a given Bmaxpro =700, at the point of C
max
I ∼ 5, fc ∼ 0.72.
Between CmaxI ∼ 6 and C
max
I ∼ 7, fc ∼ 0.61. Between C
max
I ∼ 8 and
CmaxI ∼ 9, fc ∼ 0.5. Between C
max
I ∼ 10 and C
max
I ∼ 14, fc ∼ 0.38. Between
CmaxI ∼ 15 and C
max
I ∼ 29, fc ∼ 0.25. Within the range of C
max
I ≥ 30,
fc ∼ 0.11. For a larger B
max
pro , the changing tendency of the steps changes
little while fc decreases with the rise B
max
pro .
The relationship between the cooperation level and the threshold nminC has
been plotted in fig.2 (b). For a given Bmaxpro and B
max
I , fC increases with the
rise of nminC . Within the whole range of n
min
C ≥ 1, an increase in
Bpro
BI
leads to
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Figure 3: the frequency of cooperators fC as a function of the upper limit of project
benefit Bmaxpro for the upper limit of individual benefit B
max
I =30(circles), 60(squares),
80(triangles). Other parameters are: the needed project cost Cpro=30, the upper limit
of individual contribution CmaxI =10, the minimum group size nmin = 2, the maximum
group size nmax = 50, the total number of individuals N=1000. The data are obtained
by averaging over 10 runs and 103 time steps after 104 relaxation time in each run.
an overall decrease in fC . How the parameter n
min
C influences the cooperation
level can be understood as follows[30]. In the interacting group, only when
the number of cooperators is equal to or larger than nminC , the individuals in
the group can get a net benefit, which leads to the local density of cooper-
ators. As the interacting group size evolves to n ∼ nminC , the individuals in
the group can get a net benefit only when all the individuals are cooperators.
Therefore, accompanied by the coevolutionary mechanism, the existence of
the threshold parameter nminC can promote the level of cooperation in the
present model.
The results in fig. 1 and fig. 2 indicate that an optimal level of cooperation
is determined by the coupling of the upper limit of individual contribution
and the upper limit of project benefit. If an individual’s maximum contribu-
tion to a heavy task is constrained, the level of cooperation is promoted. If
the project benefit can be enjoyed by more people, the level of cooperation
is inhibited.
As to the individual ability, the benefits and the costs are closely corre-
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Figure 4: the frequency of cooperators fc as a function of the upper limit of individual
benefit BmaxI for the upper limit of project benefit B
max
pro =600 (circles), 800 (squares),
1000 (triangles), 1500 (stars). Other parameters are: the needed project cost Cpro=30,
the upper limit of individual contribution CmaxI =10, the minimum group size nmin = 2,
the maximum group size nmax = 50, the total number of individuals N=1000. The data
are obtained by averaging over 10 runs and 103 time steps after 104 relaxation time in
each run.
lated with each other. In fig. 3, we plot the frequency of cooperators fc as a
function of the upper limit of project benefit Bmaxpro for different values of the
upper limit of individual benefit BmaxI . For a comparatively small B
max
I , i.e.
BmaxI = 30, the frequency of cooperators keeps its minimum value of fC ∼ 0
from Bmaxpro ∼ 0 to B
max
pro ∼ 300. As B
max
pro increases from B
max
pro ∼ 300 to
Bmaxpro ∼ 1200, fC firstly increases and then decreases with the rise of B
max
pro .
The maximum value of fC ∼ 0.1 is observed at the point of B
max
pro ∼ 600.
Within the range of Bmaxpro > 1200, fC keeps its stable value of fC ∼ 0.06.
The critical point of Bmaxc1pro ∼ 300, above which the cooperators begin to
occur, and the critical point of Bmaxc2pro ∼ 1200, above which the frequency of
cooperators keeps stable, are observed. For a larger BmaxI , the critical point
of Bmaxc1pro has little change while the critical point of B
maxc2
pro increases with
the rise of BmaxI . The maximum value of fC increase with the rise of B
max
I .
The dependence of fc on B
max
I for different B
max
pro is presented in fig. 4.
For a given Bmaxpro =600, as B
max
I increases from B
max
I ∼ 30 to B
max
I ∼ 110,
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Figure 5: the distribution of the preferred group-sizes (a) for the upper limit of project
benefit Bmaxpro =600 (circles), 1200 (squares), 1800 (triangles), and the needed project cost
Cpro = 30, the upper limit of individual contribution C
max
I =10, the upper limit of in-
dividual benefit BmaxI = 60; (b) for the upper limit of individual contribution C
max
I =5
(circles), 10 (squares), 15 (triangles), and the needed project cost Cpro = 30, the upper
limit of project benefit Bmaxpro =600, the upper limit of individual benefit B
max
I = 60. The
data are obtained by averaging over 10 runs and 103 time steps after 104 relaxation time
in each run.
fc increases from fc ∼ 0.1 to fc ∼ 1. As B
max
I increases from B
max
I ∼ 110
to infinity, fc keeps its maximum value of fc ∼ 1. The critical point of
BmaxcI ∼ 110, above which fc does not change with the rise of B
max
I , is
observed. An increase in Bmaxpro does not change the changing tendency of fc
vs BmaxI but leads to the rise of the critical point of B
maxc
I .
The results in fig. 3 and fig. 4 indicate that an optimal level of cooperation
is determined by the coupling of the upper limit of individual benefit and the
upper limit of project benefit. If an individual’s benefit increases with the
rise of the project benefit, an increase in the upper limit of project benefit
promotes cooperation. If an individual’s benefit has little change with the
rise of the project benefit, an increase in the upper limit of project benefit
does harm to cooperation. A larger BmaxI and a comparatively small B
max
pro
lead to the prevalence of cooperation.
In the following, the evolution of the preferred group-sizes is explored and
a functional relation between the frequency of cooperators and the distribu-
tion of the preferred group-sizes is found.
In fig. 5 (a) and (b) we plot the distribution of the preferred group-sizes
P (n) for different values of the upper limit of project benefit Bmaxpro and dif-
ferent values of the upper limit of individual contribution CmaxI respectively.
12
0 1000 2000 3000 4000
20
22
24
26
28
30
C   =10
C   =15
B
n
pro
max
C   =30,B   =60pro
I
I
I
max
max
max
Figure 6: the averaged value of the preferred group-sizes as a function of the upper limit
of project benefit Bmaxpro for the upper limit of individual contribution C
max
I =10 (circles),
15 (squares). Other parameters are: the needed project cost Cpro=30, the upper limit of
individual benefit BmaxI =60, the minimum group size nmin = 2, the maximum group size
nmax = 50, the total number of individuals N=1000. The data are obtained by averaging
over 10 runs and 103 time steps after 104 relaxation time in each run.
Figure 5 (a) shows that, for Bmaxpro =600 and C
max
I =10,P (n) is like a Poisson
distribution with the dominant group-size ndom ∼ 10. For B
max
pro =1200 and
CmaxI =10,P (n) is like a Poisson distribution with the dominant group-size
ndom ∼ 20. For a larger B
max
pro , the distribution pattern of P (n) changes little
while the dominant group-size increases with the rise of Bmaxpro . Figure 5 (b)
shows that, for a given Bmaxpro =600, an increase in the upper limit of indi-
vidual contribution CmaxI results in a broader distribution of the preferred
group-sizes. The dominant group-size ndom ∼ 10 does not change with the
rise of CmaxI .
Figure 6 shows the dependence of the averaged value of the preferred
group-sizes n¯ on the upper limit of project benefit Bmaxpro . It is observed that,
within the range of Bmaxpro < 300, n¯ keeps a constant value of n¯ ∼ 26. As B
max
pro
increases from Bmaxpro = 300 to B
max
pro = 480, n¯ has a sharp drop from n¯ ∼ 26
to n¯ ∼ 23. As Bmaxpro increases from B
max
pro ∼ 480 to B
max
pro ∼ 2000, n¯ increases
continuously from n¯ ∼ 23 to n¯ ∼ 28. The critical point of Bmaxcpro ∼ 300 is
observed. An increase in CmaxI does not change the changing tendency of n¯
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Figure 7: the frequency of cooperators fC as a function of the averaged value of the
preferred group-sizes for the upper limit of individual contribution CmaxI =10 (circles), 15
(squares). Other parameters are Cpro=30, B
max
I =10, the minimum group size nmin = 2,
the maximum group size nmax = 50, the total number of individuals N=1000. The data
are obtained by averaging over 10 runs and 103 time steps after 104 relaxation time in
each run.
vs Bmaxpro but leads to a decrease in the critical point of B
maxc
pro
The results in fig. 5 and fig. 6 indicate that both the distribution of
the preferred group-size and the dominant group-size are determined by the
coupling of the upper limit of individual contribution and the upper limit of
project benefit. Comparing the results in fig. 1 with the results in fig. 6, we
find that a larger value of the frequency of cooperators fC corresponds to a
smaller value of the averaged value of the preferred group-size and a smaller
value of the dominant group-size.
To find out the relationship between the frequency of cooperators fC and
the distribution of the preferred group-sizes P (n), the frequency of cooper-
ators fC as a function of the averaged value of the preferred group-sizes n¯
for different values of the upper limit of individual contribution CmaxI are
outlined in fig. 7. From fig. 7 we observe that, as the averaged value of the
preferred group-sizes n¯ increases from n¯ ∼ 21 to n¯ ∼ 27, the frequency of
cooperators fC decreases from fC ∼ 0.62 to fC ∼ 0.1. As the upper limit
of individual contribution CmaxI becomes large, the downtrend of fC vs n¯
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becomes moderate. As we draw a line of best fit to the simulation data in
fig. 7, a functional relation between fC and n¯, that is fC ∼ ae
−bn¯, a ∼ 114
and b ∼ 0.259 for CmaxI =10, a ∼ 157 and b ∼ 0.291 for C
max
I =15, is found.
In order to verify the robustness of the simulation results in the present
model, we have checked the role of the population size and got the figures
of fC vs B
max
pro for different values of the population size N . The relation be-
tween fC and B
max
pro is found to be robust against variations in the population
size. We have also checked the role of the population size and the pre-given
maximum group size nmax in the distribution of the preferred group-size. It
is found that the distribution of the preferred group-size is not affected by
the population size. The pre-given maximum group size nmax does not affect
the dominant group size ndom but the distribution of the preferred group-
size, which becomes broader as nmax increases. In the present model, we
pay attention to the role of individual ability and project benefit, therefore,
we only consider the cases where nmax is pre-given. The role of nmax in the
evolution of cooperation is another problem that deserves a deep research in
the future. In addition to that, the frequency of cooperators fC is found to
be closely related to the ratio of Cpro
Cmax
I
and the ratio of
Bmaxpro
Bmax
I
. fC increases
with the rise of Cpro
Cmax
I
and decreases with the rise of
Bmaxpro
Bmax
I
.
In natural and human society, the common resource can be enjoyed by
each member in the group, which may lead to the depletion of the common
resource. Public cooperation is needed for the sustainability of the com-
mon resource. Depending upon the PGG and the NSG, the evolutionary
mechanism of the occurrence and maintenance of cooperation among selfish
individuals have been studied in the scenarios where the summed benefit of
the common resource is limited and where the summed benefit of the common
resource is unlimited respectively, but the coupling effect of the two scenarios
on the evolution of cooperation is short of discussion. In the present model,
by incorporating the parameters concerning an individual, i.e. the upper limit
of individual contribution and the upper limit of individual benefit, and the
parameters concerning a project, i.e. the needed project cost and the upper
limit of project benefit, into the public goods game, the scenario in the PGG
and that in the NSG are coupled. Therefore, the present model becomes
interesting because it can be used to explore the evolutionary mechanism in
a variety of situations which are consistent with the real world. The coupling
effect of the maximum individual contribution and the needed project cost
indicates that the individuals are more possible to cooperate as they face
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a much heavier task. The coupling effect of the upper limit of individual
benefit and the upper limit of project benefit indicates that a higher level
of cooperation can be sustained only if the project benefit is limited. The
coevolution of the individual strategies and the group sizes indicates that a
smaller group is beneficial for cooperation. The observations in the present
work may be improved in the following two aspects. Firstly, the present
model only considers the homogeneous situation where each agent has the
same ability and all the projects that people done are the same. The evolu-
tion of cooperation in a heterogeneous environment deserves further study.
Secondly, the feedback between the individual contribution and the project
benefit has not been considered in the present model. How to incorporate
the non-linear relation between the individual contribution and the project
benefit into the present model is quite challenging.
4. Theoretical analysis
4.1. Relationship between the dominant group size and the coupling of indi-
vidual ability and project benefit.
In the simulation results, it is found that the equilibrium frequency of
cooperators is closely related to the averaged value of the preferred group-
sizes, which is determined by the dominant group-size and the distribution
of the preferred group-sizes. In the following, we give an analysis on the
evolutionary mechanism of the dominant group-size in the present model.
Consider the case where the group-size n is quite small, i.e. n ≤
Bmaxpro
Bmax
I
.
For nCC
max
I ≥ Cpro, the upper limit of project benefit is B
max
pro and the
payoffs of cooperators and defectors are PC = B
max
I −
Cpro
nC
and PD = B
max
I
respectively. For nCC
max
I < Cpro, the project benefit is Bpro = 0 and the
payoffs of cooperators and defectors become PC = PD = 0 accordingly. For a
given fC , the larger the group size n, the more possible there are nC(>
Cpro
Cmax
I
)
cooperators in the group. Therefore, the preferred group-size n tends to
evolve to the maximum value of n ∼
Bmaxpro
Bmax
I
.
Consider the case where the group size n is quite large, i.e. n >
Bmaxpro
Bmax
I
.
For nCC
max
I ≥ Cpro, the upper limit of project benefit is B
max
pro and the
payoffs of cooperators and defectors are PC =
Bmaxpro
n
−
Cpro
nC
and PD =
Bmaxpro
n
respectively. For nCC
max
I < Cpro, the project benefit is Bpro = 0 and the
payoffs of cooperators and defectors become PC = PD = 0 accordingly. An
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increase in the group size n is more possible to lead to a decrease in PC and
PD. Therefore, the preferred group size tend to evolve to the minimum value
of n ∼
Bmaxpro
Bmax
I
.
From the above analysis we find that the dominant group size is deter-
mined by the upper limit of project benefit and the upper limit of individual
benefit. As the minimum value of the number of cooperators in the group is
satisfied, i.e. nC ∼
Cpro
Cmax
I
, the dominant group size should be ndom ∼
Bmaxpro
Bmax
I
,
which is in accordance with the simulation data in fig. 5 (a).
4.2. Relationship between the equilibrium frequency of cooperators and the
dominant group-size.
The replicator dynamics can be applied to analyze the evolutionary be-
havior in n-player games[26]. From the above analysis we find that the dom-
inant group-size in the present model is ndom =
Bmaxpro
Bmax
I
and the minimum value
of the number of cooperators in the interacting group is nminC =
Cpro
Cmax
I
.
Suppose that the system has evolved to the state where the preferred
group-sizes of all the individuals are the same, i.e.n = ndom, and only the fol-
lowing three kinds of strategy combinations are left in the interacting group.
Group one is composed of nminC −1 cooperators and ndom−n
min
C +1 defectors.
Group two is composed of nminC cooperators and ndom−n
min
C defectors. Group
three is composed of nminC +1 cooperators and ndom−n
min
C −1 defectors. The
payoffs of cooperators and defectors within these three groups are different
from each other, that is, P
(1)
C = P
(1)
D = 0 for group one, P
(2)
C = B
max
I −
Cpro
nmin
C
and P
(2)
D = B
max
I for group two, P
(3)
C = B
max
I −
Cpro
nmin
C
+1
and P
(3)
D = B
max
I for
group three.
Firstly, consider the case where only group two and group three coexist.
For a cooperator in group two, because his payoff is less than the payoff of the
cooperators in group three and the payoff of the defectors in group two and
group three, that is P
(2)
C < P
(3)
C < P
(2)
D = P
(3)
D , he is more likely to become
a defector or keep his original strategy. Therefore, group two is possible to
become group one or have no change in the next time step. For a cooperator
in group three, he is also more likely to become a defector or keep his original
strategy. Therefore, group three is possible to become group two or have no
change in the next time step. The above two evolutionary processes will lead
to such a scenario where the number of group two keeps stable while the
number of group three decreases.
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Secondly, consider the case where only group one and group two coexist.
For a cooperator or a defector in group one, because his payoff is less than
the payoff of the cooperators or the defectors in group two, that is P
(1)
C =
P
(1)
D < P
(2)
C < P
(2)
D , he is more likely to update his strategy and become a
cooperator or defector as that in group two in the next time step. Therefore,
group one is possible to become group two in the next time step. For a
cooperator in group two, he is more likely to become a defector or keep his
original strategy. Therefore, group two is possible to become group one in
the next time step. The above two evolutionary processes will lead to such
a scenario where the number of group two keeps stable while the number of
group one decreases.
Therefore, as the system has evolved to the state where only group one,
group two and group three are left, it is more likely that the system will
reach an equilibrium in the next time step. The equilibrium frequency of
cooperators should be fC ∼
nminC
ndom
, in which nminC ∼
Cpro
Cmax
I
, ndom ∼
Bmaxpro
Bmax
I
.
To verify the above analysis, here we only consider the simplest case where
ndom = 3 and n
min
C = 2. The averaged payoff of cooperators is
P¯C =
C2Nc−1(B
max
I −
Cpro
3
) + C1Nc−1C
1
N−Nc
(BmaxI −
Cpro
2
) + C2N−Nc × 0
C2N−1
, (5)
and the averaged payoff of defectors is
P¯D =
C2NcB
max
I + (C
1
NcC
1
N−Nc + C
2
N−Nc)× 0
C2N−1
. (6)
In the equilibrium state, P¯C = P¯D,
C2Nc−1(B
max
I −
Cpro
3
) + C1Nc−1C
1
N−Nc(B
max
I −
Cpro
2
) = C2NcB
max
I . (7)
1
2
(Nc−1)(Nc−2)(B
max
I −
Cpro
3
)+(Nc−1)(N−Nc)(B
max
I −
Cpro
2
) =
1
2
Nc(Nc−1)B
max
I .
(8)
(Nc − 2)(B
max
I −
Cpro
3
) + 2(N −Nc)(B
max
I −
Cpro
2
) = NcB
max
I . (9)
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(fc −
2
N
)(BmaxI −
Cpro
3
) + 2(1− fc)(B
max
I −
Cpro
2
) = fcB
max
I , (10)
(
2Cpro
3
− 2BmaxI )fc = Cpro − 2B
max
I +
2
N
(BmaxI −
Cpro
3
), (11)
fc =
2BmaxI − Cpro −
2
N
(BmaxI −
Cpro
3
)
2BmaxI −
2Cpro
3
, (12)
fc =
1− Cpro
2Bmax
I
−
1
N
(1− Cpro
3Bmax
I
)
1− Cpro
3Bmax
I
. (13)
On condition that N → ∞, we get fc =
1−
Cpro
2Bmax
I
1−
Cpro
3Bmax
I
. For a given Cpro and
Bmaxpro , increasing B
max
I will lead to a decrease in ndom and an increase in fC ,
which is in accordance with the theoretical analysis of fC ∼
nminC
ndom
.
5. Summary
In sum, we have put forward a generalized version of the public goods
game with limited individual ability and maximum project rewards, focusing
on revealing how the limitations of individual ability and project rewards
affect the prevalence of cooperation. The lower the upper limit of an individ-
ual’s contribution, the higher the frequency of cooperation. Such an impact
is closely related to the upper limit of project benefit. The transition point
of the upper limit of project benefit, at which the highest level of cooperation
is obtained, is found.
The evolutionary dynamics of cooperation in the present model can be
understood by taking into account the coevolution of the cooperator fre-
quencies and the preferred group-sizes. As the upper limit of project benefit
decreases, the frequency of cooperators increases while the averaged value
of the preferred group-sizes decreases. A functional relation between the
equilibrium frequency of cooperators and the dominant group sizes is found.
In future studies, it will be interesting to investigate how the hetero-
geneity of individual abilities influences the prevalence of cooperation. Some
pioneering efforts have already been made along this path. Depending upon
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the evolutionary PD game, A. Szolnoki et al. have studied the effect of the
heterogeneity of strategy adoption on the evolution of cooperation[56]. A
significant increase in cooperation has been found. Depending upon the PD
game, M. Perc et al. have studied the role of diversity in wealth and social
status in the evolution of cooperation[57]. They have found that the inho-
mogeneity in wealth and social status can effectively promote cooperation.
Depending upon the evolutionary PD game, A. Szolnoki et al. have studied
the role of the diversity of reproduction rate in the evolution of cooperation.
They have found that the diversity in the reproduction capability is benefi-
cial for the occurrence of cooperative behaviour[58]. In addition to that, the
revealed mechanism of diverse sets of thresholds can be incorporated into
other evolutionary game models and the evolutionary dynamics closer to the
real world will be explored extensively.
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